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Article 9

The Economics of the Restatement
and of the Common Law
Keith N. Hylton†
INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the most optimistic view of the American Law
Institute’s Restatement project was provided at its inception by
Benjamin Cardozo:
When, finally, it goes out under the name and with the sanction of
the Institute, after all this testing and retesting, it will be something
less than a code and something more than a treatise. It will be
invested with unique authority, not to command, but to persuade. It
will embody a composite thought and speak a composite voice.
Universities and bench and bar will have had a part in its creation. I
have great faith in the power of such a restatement to unify our law.1

I will take a somewhat less optimistic view here. The
incentives of actors in the common law process have been
examined many times.2 Much less has been said about the
incentives of actors in the Restatement process.
Incentives are always something to worry about, at least
from the perspective of the non-optimist. Holmes referred to
the law as reflecting a concern for the decisions of the “bad
man.”3 The Holmesian bad man was not necessarily bad in the
sense of being evil. He was bad in the sense that he acted solely
for his own advantage after calculating the private costs and
benefits of his actions.4 Many lawyers have to consult with bad
men of this type all of the time. As much as we would like to
† William Fairfield Warren Distinguished Professor, Boston University, and
Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. knhylton@bu.edu. For helpful
comments I thank Anita Bernstein, Andrew Kull, Lance Liebman, and participants in
the Brooklyn Law School Symposium, Restatement of . . . . For research assistance, I
thank Nina Prevot.
1 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 9 (Yale Univ. Press, 1924).
2 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (6th ed. 2003);
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS (3d ed. 2000).
3 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,
459-61 (1897).
4 Id.
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emphasize ethics and moral standards in the legal academy,
lawyers in the real world have to provide advice to clients who
do not have justice or social welfare at the top of their agendas.
The common law process itself could be distorted by the
actions of Holmesian bad men. Judges might decide cases out
of self-interest or with a disregard for a certain type of litigant.
The common law process, if it is as good as the evidence
suggests,5 must have built deep within it some shock absorbers
to minimize the impact of bad men on its development. In other
words, the common law process presumably has checks and
balances that prevent the self-interest of a particular
embedded actor (judge or lawyer) from having a substantial
effect. This is a question, in any event, that I will consider here.
The question that immediately follows is whether the
Restatement project is also immune—to the same extent as is
the common law—from the self-interested incentives of actors
involved in its creation. I will argue that it is far more
vulnerable to distortion from self-interest than the common law
process. Because of this, it is an open question whether the
Restatements will, as Cardozo believed, unify and improve the
common law.
I.

THE COMMON LAW PROCESS AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Some impressive legal authorities have defended the
common law. Blackstone, for example, singlehandedly set out a
unified account and defense of the common law, as well as its
history and policies.6 Blackstone’s account, which shaped legal
education for roughly a century after its publication, describes
the common law as virtually synonymous with reason and
holds that any unambiguously unreasonable rule should be
regarded as not part of the common law—even if a court says
that it is.7 Blackstone never quite explained what it means for
the law to be reasonable, but one can infer from his arguments
that the common law is reasonable because it is based on
norms adopted by convention. Such norms should be
reasonable because they reflect implicit agreements or
conventions that maximize the joint welfare of all interested
5 See Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113
(1998); Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be
Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (2001).
6 See generally WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND (Univ. of Chicago Press 1979).
7 Id. at 69-70.
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parties. These norms would trade off competing interests in an
objective manner; they would reflect the choices of an impartial
spectator.8 Courts could discover these norms in the course of
deciding legal disputes.
Blackstone’s hazy, almost mystical reverence for reason
in the common law generated a vicious counterattack by
Bentham, who argued that reason could only be understood
from the perspective of self-interest.9 What is reasonable to me,
Bentham argued, is what I think is good.10 The same goes for
you. There is no perspective-neutral argument for believing
that something I find reasonable would also be reasonable in
your eyes. The common law materializes, then, when one of us
is able to assert control over the framing of a legal rule. The
one who prevails declares the law that suits him to be
reasonable, putting an end to disputes over the law.
The notion of reasonableness in the common law would
have its next great defender in Holmes.11 Reasonableness in the
law resulted, according to Holmes, from trading off competing
interests in a manner that maximized social welfare. Courts
sacrifice a dollar of gain to Sam if that gain would result in a
two-dollar loss to Joe. The rules that emerged from this
utilitarian balancing did not necessarily reflect underlying
societal norms that courts had discovered. The rules were
imposed by courts, as Bentham believed. In the common law
process, disputes in which the appropriate or prevailing norm
was unclear were litigated and re-litigated in court until a
utility-maximizing set of rules was established.
The most recent defense of the common law is the
efficiency thesis associated with Posner.12 Common law rules
tend to be economically efficient, in the sense that they
minimize social costs. Like Holmes, Posner argues that the
courts choose these rules without necessarily relying on or
discovering underlying social norms. Efficiency differs from the
utility maximization process envisioned by Holmes in the sense
See BRUNO LEONI, FREEDOM AND THE LAW 13-15 (3rd ed. 1991).
See JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT (Cambridge Univ.
Press 1988); see also GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION
(Clarendon Press 1986).
10 Jeremy Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries, in A COMMENT ON
THE COMMENTARIES AND A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 159 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart
eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2008) (“A regulation lies before me. I look at it and pronounce
that it is ‘unreasonable’: what is it that I mean by this? Just this much and no more;
that my reason, i.e. I myself, applying to it that faculty in me which is called reason, do
not approve of it.”).
11 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (Little, Brown & Co. 1881).
12 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (8th ed. 2011).
8
9
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that efficiency takes markets, explicit and implicit, into
account.13 An efficient solution is consistent with one that the
market, in its ideal form free of transactional barriers and
externalities, would generate. To find the efficient solution, a
judge need only consult the market or try to imagine what the
market would have provided. In contrast, utility maximization,
as stressed by Holmes, does not necessarily attempt to
replicate an ideal market.14 Utility maximization might result
in an inefficient outcome that is preferred by a faction with
intense preferences and control over the law creation process.
However, outside of this rather special case, the welfare
maximization and economic efficiency theses are equivalent in
terms of their implications for the common law.
The welfare maximization arguments of Holmes and
Posner do not explain how the common law moves toward
welfare-maximizing rules. If the law were controlled entirely by
one judge, and that judge were committed to inefficient
outcomes, presumably the law would not be efficient or welfare
maximizing. This suggests that there must be features of the
common law process that permit reasonable, efficient, or
welfare-maximizing rules to evolve and to persist.
Paul Rubin offered what is perhaps the most persuasive
theory for evolution toward welfare-maximizing common law
rules.15 Rubin argued that inefficient rules would be litigated
more often than efficient rules, and, because of this greater
rate of litigation, inefficient rules would be overturned more
often than efficient rules.16 Inefficient rules would be litigated
more because, relative to efficient rules, such rules reduce the
joint welfare of long-term stakeholders involved in any dispute.
Given this, the stakeholders would have incentives to overturn
the rule through litigation. Alternatively, the stakeholders
could overturn an inefficient rule through private agreement.17
13 Keith N. Hylton, Calabresi and the Intellectual History of Law and
Economics, 64 MD. L. REV. 85, 90 (2005).
14 Id.
15 Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 53
(1977) (“If rules are inefficient, there will be an incentive for the party held liable to
force litigation; if rules are efficient, there will be no such incentive.”).
16 For example, suppose the likelihood of a rule being overturned is ten
percent. If inefficient rules are litigated more often than efficient rules, then inefficient
rules will be overturned more frequently. For a careful examination of this argument,
see Robert Cooter & Lewis Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law Without the
Help of Judges?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1980).
17 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (Harvard Univ. Press, 1991); Keith N. Hylton & Sungjoon Cho, The
Economics of Injunctive and Reverse Settlements, 12 AM. LAW & ECON. REV. 181 (2010).
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For example, suppose property law gave the right to cut
down the old oak tree on John Doe’s property to Richard Roe,
Doe’s neighbor. In most cases such as this, John Doe would put
a higher value on keeping the tree than Richard Roe would put
on cutting down the tree. Suppose, for example, John Doe
values the tree at $4,000 and Richard Roe values the absence of
the tree at $1,000. If the inefficient rule granting the property
right to Richard Roe were overturned, John Doe would gain
$4,000 and Richard Roe would lose $1,000; their joint gain
would be $3,000. If John Doe could sue to overturn the
inefficient rule for a relatively small expense, he would do so.
Richard Roe would not be willing to invest more than $1,000 in
a lawsuit defending his right to cut down the tree. John Doe
would be willing to spend up to $4,000 to gain the right of
control over the tree. Given these differences in willingness-topay, litigation is likely to lead eventually to a decision in which
the property rule giving the neighbor the right of control over
the tree is overturned.
In addition to simply challenging inefficient legal rules,
litigation also provides information to courts. Each litigant has
strong incentives to reveal every fact that could bolster his side
of the case. The end result is that a court receives far more
information, from parties with direct and opposing stakes, than
any other regulatory or legislative institution in existence. As
Hayek stressed in relation to markets,18 the litigation process
induces actors to reveal information that they would otherwise
keep private.19
The evolutionary arguments discussed so far leave out
the role of the law itself. The common law, Blackstone noted,
equates legal validity with reasonableness.20 This means that
legal decisions in the common law process have to be justified
on the basis of reasonableness. Reasonableness typically has
been explained in terms of the trade-off in competing utilities,
objectively evaluated, or in terms of the expectations of the
parties.21 Judges often defend their decisions by highlighting
the implications their decisions may have on the welfare of
parties that are in the same positions as the litigants. Those
F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945).
See Keith N. Hylton, Information, Litigation, and Common Law Evolution,
8 AM. LAW & ECON. REV. 33 (2006) (private information on facts improves common
law); Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, The Evolution of Common Law, 115 J. POL.
ECON. 43 (2007) (private policy preferences of judges improve common law over time).
20 BLACKSTONE, supra note 4 at 69-70.
21 See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY AND
COMMON LAW EVOLUTION 98-99 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003).
18
19
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justifications become grounds for subsequent reexaminations of
the legal rule.
Reasonableness arguments are not infinitely malleable.
There is only so much spin that you can put on the
reasonableness justification for a court decision. Return to the
example of John Doe and Richard Roe. A court could argue that
the inefficient rule should be deemed reasonable by asserting,
falsely, that most neighbors would put a higher valuation on
control over a tree on a given piece of property than would the
property owner himself.22 But this is an empirical proposition that
can be tested and proven false. The common law process allows
for such empirical propositions to be tested in the litigation
process; indeed, the appeals process provides a direct test of
relative valuations. The decentralization of the common law
process implies that empirical propositions will be tested and
retested, both formally in evaluation by independent judges,
and informally—though perhaps more effectively—through the
hurdles of the litigation process. Justifications that are not
falsified will be accepted and adopted by other courts, which, in
turn, will lead to a rapid dissemination of the welfaremaximizing rule.
The testing and retesting of empirical reasonableness
propositions in the common law occurs both horizontally—that
is, among other courts of the same hierarchical status—and
vertically—that is, among appellate courts of superior status.
Extremely biased policy preferences held by a minority of judges
will tend to be cancelled out at the horizontal level, and the
average set of policy preferences of a band of like-courts will
prevail.23 Similarly, the appellate process presents the same
opportunity for judges to reconsider empirically false
assessments of reasonableness. Courts hearing a case on appeal
are guided by the information revealed by the opposing parties.24
The cost of appeal screens out some litigants who have benefited
from an empirically false assessment of relative costs and
benefits. The appeals process forces Roe to post a bond, in
effect, to support his assertion that his valuation of the old oak
tree exceeds Doe’s. But if Roe does not really care about the
tree, he is unlikely to accept the burden of appeal.
22 I do not mean to suggest that the court would deliberately assert a false
statement. It is sufficient for this argument that judges have different policy
preferences, and those policy preferences lead them to make different judgments on
comparative utilities. See Gennaioli & Shleifer, supra note 19.
23 Id.
24 Hylton, supra note 19.
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The rule of reason, which has generated specific
utilitarian balancing tests in the common law, operates as a
type of core code, or metarule, that facilitates the killing off of
inefficient rules and the rapid dissemination of efficient rules.
Because of the discretionary, utilitarian balancing in the common
law, calibrated in every application by the private information
revealed by litigants, welfare-maximizing rules emerge at a faster
rate than would be observed if courts decided cases randomly and
simply followed the precedent of previous courts.
The core code inserted by the common law into the
judicial process is a general utilitarian balancing test that
compares discrete choices—the rule favored by the defendant
with the rule favored by the plaintiff. If the rule favored by the
plaintiff increases the burden on the defendant, but results in a
trivial benefit to the potential victims, or, even worse, increases
the risks to other potential victims, then a court would find the
proposed rule of the plaintiff unreasonable.
To give just one example, consider Cooley v. Public
Service Co.25 The plaintiff complained about a traumatic
neurosis that resulted from a loud explosive noise in her
telephone. The noise occurred when one of the defendant power
company’s cables snapped during a heavy storm, landed on a
telephone cable running several feet beneath it, and burned
through the telephone cable. The plaintiff argued that the power
company was guilty of negligence because it failed to maintain
devices—where its wires crossed over telephone lines—that
would have prevented the accident that injured her. She
proposed a wire-mesh basket that would catch the power cable
before it landed on the telephone line. The court found, however,
that while the plaintiff’s proposed design reduced the risk of an
accident of the sort that occurred, it increased the risk of
electrocution to a person on the street. The court held that an
accurate assessment of reasonable care would require a
comparison of the burden of the plaintiff’s alternative design to
the net change in aggregate harm resulting from the design.
Note that in Cooley, the court applied the utilitarian
balancing test in a manner that compared the specific
precaution proposed by the plaintiff to its expected net social
benefits. The standard “Hand Formula” analysis of comparing
the burden of precaution to the foreseeable loss was modified to
take into account the foreseeable net social loss. As this case
illustrates, and as judges and litigants understand, the
25

Cooley v. Pub. Serv. Co., 10 A.2d 673 (N.H. 1940).
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reasonableness criterion gives courts the flexibility to modify
previously adopted algorithms to take into account all of the
relevant social costs and benefits.
The core code of the common law allows courts to discover
welfare-maximizing rules without first having the information
required to do so. The common law reasonableness requirement
provides a general balancing test of which litigants are aware.
The litigants have every incentive to reveal information to the
court that tips the balancing test in their favor. Judges do not
need to be experts in a specific area of litigation for the general
test to favor efficient rules. All judges need to do is recognize the
nature of the test and allow its application to be determined by
the factual content provided by the litigating parties.
The decentralization of the common law process implies
that a particular faction that wants to see its own welfarereducing version of the law adopted in a majority of jurisdictions,
or within a single jurisdiction containing several independent
judges, will have to work very hard. The faction may be able to
persuade a minority of judges, but its work may not have an
impact on other judges. Moreover, the decisions of the minority of
judges who were persuaded by the faction are continually
vulnerable to challenge by opposing litigants. In order to carry
out an effective lobbying campaign under the common law, a
faction committed to a particular inefficient legal rule would
have to litigate continually in virtually every court. Once a
judge discovers that the faction’s preferred rule is inefficient,
and explains why it is so in an opinion, other courts are likely
to be influenced by the reasoning of the better-informed judge.
II.

THE RESTATEMENT PROCESS

The process I have just described for the common law
differs from the process by which a Restatement is created. Here
is a simple model of the Restatement process. A Restatement
Reporter reads the court opinions in an area of law, say tort law.
The Reporter then tries to codify the rules that courts have
applied, and offers interpretive guidance. By “codify,” I mean
that the Reporter attempts to summarize the common law in
the form of codes or rules. The Reporter then has his
codifications approved by the ALI, which means that lawyers,
judges, and law professors get to look over the Reporter’s
codification to make sure that it is consistent with their
readings of the law. A persuasive codification might convince a
court to change a rule that it had previously adopted.
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There are many ways in which this process differs from
the common law process. First, we begin with a single Reporter
(or maybe more than one Reporter) who eventually writes a
final rule. In comparison, the common law process does not rely
on a single judge, and no judge produces a final rule. Every
rule of the common law is constantly subject to testing by
parties who have a deep investment in the dispute. Indeed, the
common law consists of rules and relies on an underlying
background norm, the rule of reason, to reexamine those rules.
The rule of reason is sometimes crystallized in the form of
particular rules—such as, for example, that contributory
negligence does not bar recovery from an intentional
wrongdoer26—but those rules are required to be consistent with
the general rule of reason.27 Because of this ever-present
requirement, the consideration of new facts might require a
change in a rule, or a change in the way that a rule is stated, so
that the rule remains consistent with the background norm.
A Restatement Reporter who is committed to an
inefficient rule, or to inefficient rules in general, has
considerable freedom to interpret common law rules with a
slant toward inefficiency. That slant is unlikely to be corrected
by the rule-development process for two reasons. First, there
are relatively few litigants directly involved with a stake in the
rule. Second, there are no other Reporters, vertically above or
horizontally in competition, who are likely to reject the proposed
rules and publish alternative rules. Of course, there are many
prominent law professionals who review Restatement drafts, and
many who provide detailed comments. But as a general matter,
this type of review is unlikely to involve the same combination of
intensity and fear as one observes in the litigation process. A
judge who tells a Reporter that his reading of the law is wrong
probably has little direct leverage to force the Reporter to change.
Of course, the ALI has to approve the Reporter’s work,
which constrains the Reporter’s freedom. But the ALI as a body
is similar to a population of voters in an election process. The
typical voter does not have a strong incentive to spend
resources in determining the validity of any particular claim
put to a vote.28 Indeed, if the voter believes that his vote is not
pivotal, he either has weak incentives to replicate the
See, e.g., Ruter v. Foy, 46 Iowa 132 (1877); Steinmetz v. Kelly, 72 Ind. 442 (1880).
Holmes, supra note 11 at 110-15; see also Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud
in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 592-3 (1988).
28 On the incentives of voters, see DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II
348-50 (1989) and ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 141 (1957).
26
27
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Reporter’s research or can easily be persuaded by any side of
the issue. The problem of rational apathy, apparent in most
voting processes, is likely to be present to some degree in the
ALI approval process.
It is not clear that this process would be improved by
having multiple Reporters rather than a single Reporter. A single
Reporter may worry more about permitting his individual
preferences to control his interpretation of rules than would one of
many Reporters. A single Reporter may think that his reputation
would suffer greatly if the whole project were deemed defective
because of distortions caused by his biases. One of many
Reporters, on the other hand, may feel that his contribution is
relatively small, and he therefore gains the benefits of
imposing his biases while externalizing the costs to the
Restatement in general. In other words, one of many Reporters
may be like the franchisee who gets the benefits from cutting
costs or from enhancing some related business interest, while
spreading the losses in the form of reduced goodwill across the
entire franchise network.29
These arguments suggest that the checks—constraining
distortions due to self-interest or excessive zeal—observed in
the common law process are not at work in the Restatement
process, or at least not at work with the same force. As a result,
a Reporter who is committed to a particular view of rules—a nonutilitarian view for example—could impress his perspective upon
some of the rules that he codifies without running into a serious
obstacle in the Restatement process.
In addition, compared to the common law process, the
ALI process suffers from a greater vulnerability to lobbying. A
member of an interest group with a particular view of the law
can contact the ALI Reporter and attempt to persuade him. Of
course, most ALI Reporters would see through an attempt by
openly pro-defendant or pro-plaintiff groups to have the law
interpreted in a manner that favors them. But the lobbying
effort becomes more difficult to identify when the motive of the
group is unclear, or when the interest is in the nature of a
commitment to a particular view of the law. By contrast,
motivation is never in doubt in the common law process, which
makes lobbying more difficult.
These differences between the common law and the ALI
processes may explain some of the instances in which the ALI
29 Paul H. Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of Franchise
Contracts, 21 J. LAW & ECON. 223, 227-28 (1978).
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process has produced rules that seem to be inconsistent with
the common law codification goal of the Restatements. I will
discuss a few of those instances in the next part, confining my
attention to previous Restatements.
The First Restatement of Torts and the Second
Restatement of Torts have both benefited from being under the
control of the most capable Reporters one could imagine:
Francis Bohlen oversaw the First Restatement and William
Prosser oversaw the Second Restatement. Prosser appears to
have been the most careful of all in his efforts to prevent
personal bias and opinion from influencing the Restatement.
George Priest’s critique of his work on products liability,
however, suggests that Prosser was not entirely immune from
the bias disease.30 In the remainder of this article, I will
examine the work of Bohlen and Prosser, and offer a few
remarks on the Third Restatement.
A.

Bohlen on Consent and Mutual Combat

An early example of Reporter bias having an effect on
the Restatement appears in the First Restatement of Torts in
its rules on mutual combat. Francis Bohlen, the Restatement
Reporter, had to choose between two rules. One, adopted in the
majority of states, held that consent to engage in mutual
combat is not a defense to battery.31 The other, the minority
rule, held that consent to engage in mutual combat is a defense
to battery so long as the evidence indicates that the prevailing
party did not use excessive force or act with an intention to
severely injure the other party.32 Bohlen, having already
published a paper in which he criticized the majority rule,33
adopted the minority rule as the Restatement provision on
mutual combat.34 He included the proviso that consent would
not be recognized as a defense in states that had expressed a
30 See George Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History
of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUDIES 461, 514
(1985) (“Prosser’s appendix supported his claim of an explosion in the law toward strict
liability by the citation of forty cases. A rereading of these cases today suggests either that
what Prosser meant by strict liability is vastly different from the regime that has evolved or
that Prosser’s discovery of a trend in the case law was largely his own creation.”).
31 See, e.g., Adams v. Waggoner, 33 Ind. 531 (1870); Mullin, 79 P. 168 (Kan.
1905); Barholt v. Wright, 12 N.E. 185 (Ohio 1887); McNeil v.; Royer v. Belcher, 131 S.E.
556 (W. Va. 1926).
32 Hart v. Geysel, 294 P. 570, 572 (Wash. 1930).
33 Francis Bohlen, Consent as Affecting Civil Liability for Breaches of the
Peace, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 819, 834-35 (1924).
34 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 61 (1934).
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policy of protecting individuals who were unable to fully
understand the nature of the risk they took on.35
Setting aside Bohlen’s decision to adopt the minority
rule as the Restatement provision on mutual combat, his
reading of the law on consent in the mutual combat context is
questionable. Hart v. Geysel indicates that the rule recognizing
consent as a defense was accompanied with a qualification that
limited the rule’s applicability in cases where the defendant
used excessive force or intended to severely injure his
adversary.36 Bohlen ignored this important qualification and
treated mutual combat as indistinguishable from any other
setting in which consent might be an issue.
As a general matter, treating mutual combat as
indistinguishable from any other setting in which consent is an
issue introduces confusion into the law. The common law has
long assessed physical contact using special rules when
questions of consent are presented. One’s consent to the nature
of the act and the identity of the actor generally operates as a
valid assent to physical contact.37 Someone who consents to a
touch in exchange for a counterfeit $100 dollar bill, fully aware
of the nature of the touch and the person doing the touching,
does not have a claim for battery against the party who inflicts
the touch; he only has a claim for fraud or for contract breach.
At first glance, this seems hard to reconcile with the law of
battery. To establish a prima facie claim for battery, one must
only show a touch was motivated by an intention to inflict a
potentially harmful bodily contact. Touches that occur after
fraudulently induced consent would appear to be based on a
desire to inflict harmful bodily contact, but the law does not
treat them as such. In contrast to the law, Bohlen’s treatment
of the consent question in the mutual combat setting imposes a
contractual framework over the question of consent to a touch,
suggesting generally that any fraudulent misrepresentation as
to the basis for a touch might justify bringing a battery claim.
A student of the law, exposed early to Bohlen’s work, would be
set on a path that would require correction later.
The more serious and practical problem introduced by
Bohlen’s Restatement provision is its failure to incorporate the
excessive force qualification of the minority rule. If one looks
closely at the qualification adopted in the minority rule
35
36
37

Id. § 69.
See Hart, 294 P. at 572.
R. v. Clarence, 22 Q.B.D. 23 (U.K. 1888).
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jurisdictions, it has the effect of severely limiting the role of
consent as a defense or excuse. In essence, the qualification
holds that consent is a defense in the mutual combat setting,
except when the injuring party has gone too far. This
qualification makes consent an extremely thin defense.
There is a good reason for this limiting qualification. If
one considers the typical setting in which the party injured in
mutual combat sues the injuring party, it is likely that the
injuring party has used excessive force under the circumstances.
One excessive force scenario is where the injuring party has
pushed his advantage too far, to the point of overkill. In a case
of overkill, the injuring party continues to punch the injured
party long after he is unable to put up a fight. Another
excessive force scenario involves an asymmetry of force, as in
the case where one combatant uses a knife on another who uses
only his fists. The injured party, feeling that the treatment he
received from the injuring party went well beyond the implicit
terms of the agreement, would see nothing incongruous in
suing for battery after having agreed to the fight. A spectator,
having observed the whole scenario, probably would not find
the injured party’s decision to sue unreasonable, too.
On the other hand, consider the mutual fistfight where
the injuring combatant gets in a good punch, and then steps
back to let the injured combatant fall. This is not a case of
overkill or asymmetric force. The reasonable participant in
mutual combat would realize that he had received the
treatment that he had contracted for.
A representative sample of mutual combat cases,
presented below in Table 1, shows that the cases in which
defendants are held liable, whether analyzed under the majority
or the minority rule, contain evidence of excessive force. The least
clear example of excessive force among these sample cases is
McNeil v. Mullin;38 the court provides little detail on the
exchange of blows. But the court’s references to the defendant’s
commission of a mayhem suggest that the defendant used
excessive force. Mayhem, a common law crime and trespass, is
the intentional cutting off or destroying of an appendage of the
victim’s body, such as a hand or finger, so that the victim is left
unable or less able to defend himself in battle.39 Although the
details of the encounter described in McNeil mainly cover the
exchange of insults leading up to the fight rather than the fight
38
39

McNeil v. Mullin, 79 P. 168 (Kan. 1905).
BLACKSTONE, supra note 4 at 121.
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itself, it is hard to see how an ordinary fistfight could result in the
commission of a mayhem in the absence of the use of excessive or
inappropriate force. The precise type of mayhem inflicted on the
plaintiff is not described in the opinion, but the least injurious
that one could imagine—say, the biting off of a finger—would
easily qualify as excessive force under the circumstances.
The sample cases also suggest that a finding of
excessive force is necessary for liability in the minority rule
cases. The key difference between the majority and minority
rule cases appears to be that if the evidence of excessive force is
unclear, then there generally will be no liability under the
minority rule. The majority rule, in contrast, does not require
evidence of excessive force in order to hold a combatant liable,
but moderates (or mitigates) damages according to the reciprocal
nature of the exchange.40 In terms of the incentives to file suit,
or to engage in combat, the minority and majority rules may be
roughly equivalent.

40 See Littledike v. Wood, 255 P. 172, 174 (Utah 1927) (“The claim made is
that who committed the first act of violence was material in mitigation of damages. The
fact that the parties mutually engaged in a combat, though with anger, may be relied
upon and considered in mitigation of damages; but in such case who struck the first
blow, or committed the first act of violence, is in and of itself of no controlling nor
important factor of the question, for in such a mutual combat both parties are
aggressors and voluntary combatants. The court well could have charged the jury that
in case of mutual combat such fact properly could and should be considered in
mitigation of damages, except where an injury of a serious character was maliciously
inflicted by excessive and unreasonable force, or in a vicious or brutal manner. We
think no error was committed in the particular as claimed.”); Adams v. Waggoner, 33
Ind. 531, 533 (1870); Barholt v. Wright, 12 N.E. 185, 188 (Ohio St. 1887); Royer v.
Belcher, 131 S.E. 556, 556-557 (W. Va. 1926).
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF MUTUAL COMBAT CASES
Case

Rule

Excessive Force?

Fact Summary

Liability

Adams v.
Waggoner,
33 Ind. 531
(1870)

Majority

Some evidence of
overkill, but court does
not go into detail.

The two men engaged
in a mutual fight, but
the defendant brought
out a knife and
severely wounded the
plaintiff.

Yes

Barhold v.
Wright, 12
N.E. 185
(Ohio 1887)

Majority

Yes, the court called
the excess a “mayhem.”

The parties consented
to fight one another,
but the defendant bit
off the plaintiff ’ s
finger.

Yes

Smith v.
Simon, 37
N.W. 548
(Mich. 1888)

Minority

No excessive cruelty or
unnecessary beating or
harshness.

Defendant broke
plaintiff ’ s arm and
dislocated his
shoulder. They agreed
mutually to fight “in
fun.” The parties were
wrestling.

No

White v.
Whittall, 71
N.W. 1118
(Mich. 1897)

Minority

Short opinion, court
views the offensive
contact as mutual.

No

Mc.Neil v.
Mullin, 79
P. 168
(Kan. 1905)

Majority

Yes, the Petition
Against the defendant
is for injuries sustained
from a mayhem.

Parties began a fight
in the middle of the
highway, using
offensive language in
front of their children.
Both were equally
“eager for the fray.”
A series of insulting
comments back in
forth resulted in both
men getting off their
buggies, taking off
their hat and coat,
and having a fistfight.

Milam v.
Milam, 90
P. 595
(Wash. 1907)

Probably
Minority

Yes, the biting of the
knuckle was “cruel and
unjustifiable.”

Parties got into a
dispute after one
accused the other of
telling lies in court,
resulting in a struggle
and a fistfight.
Plaintiff ’ s knuckle
was bitten off and
finger was broken.

Yes

Lykins v.
Hamrick,
137 S.W.
852 (Ky.
1911)

Minority

No, both used knives,
and when they
separated, both were
injured but neither too
severely.

Parties were
neighbors and friends
for a long time. They
fought with knives in
the front yard after
one made offensive
remarks towards the
other.

No

Yes
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Case

Rule

Excessive Force?

Fact Summary

Liability

Colby v.
McClendon,
206 P. 207
(Okla. 1922)

Majority

Although there was no
overkill, it was with
deadly weapons so
majority rule applies.

Yes

Royer v.
Belcher,
131 S.E.
556 (W. Va.
1926)

Majority

Some evidence of
overkill, in light of the
plaintiff ’ s inability to
respond with equal
force.

Littledike v.
Wood, 255
P. 172
(Utah 1927)

Majority

Yes, defendant kicked
plaintiff in the ribs
after he was almost
unconscious.

Gunfight ensued after
a dispute over a land
conveyance, resulting
in the death of the
decedent and another
party.
Defendant’s wife
informed him of an
insulting remark
made by the plaintiff.
D went to P’s house
where a fight broke
out. D repeatedly
punched P resulting
in P losing his glasses
and physical injuries
requiring a doctor.
After a dispute over
hay bales, the parties
engaged in a fight.
Plaintiff was kicked in
the ribs causing a
punctured lung. He
also lost some teeth,
and his face was cut
and bruised.

Yes

Yes

If the excessive force scenarios just described explain
the vast majority of cases in which individuals injured in
mutual combat sue their opponents, then, as a practical
matter, the excessive force qualification attached to the
minority rule swallows the consent portion of the rule. There
would be few cases in which a willing prizefight participant
brought suit and won substantial damages against an opponent
who had obtained a victory by fair means and who did not use
excessive force. The circumstances most likely to give rise to a
battery lawsuit would be those where the consent defense is
precluded by the excessive force qualification.
Indeed, the law on mutual combat appears to follow a
rather simple set of utilitarian principles: as the danger of the
type of mutual combat increases, the scope of prohibition
expands, and the extent to which consent serves as a defense to
battery narrows. The most dangerous types of mutual combat,
including combat with deadly weapons, were prohibited, and
consent to engage in such contests would not serve as a
defense.41 Dueling with guns or swords, for example, was illegal
41 See Hart, 294 P. at 573 (Holcomb, J., dissenting) (“Had it been a duel, it
would have been unlawful and consent to fight a duel would not prevent recovery by
either those injured, on the ground of excessive force, or the heirs or personal
representatives of those injured.”).
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and consent to such dueling would not serve as a defense in a
lawsuit brought by an injured party.42 Perhaps a sufficient
reason for prohibiting such duels is that they put innocent
third parties at risk of injury or death. The next level down
from dueling is boxing. Boxing can be as deadly as dueling. On
the other hand, boxing with padded gloves is likely to be less
dangerous, depending on how the conduct is carried out.43
Given the variation in the level of danger associated with
boxing—to participants and to third parties—the degree to
which consent could serve as a defense should vary according
to the specific danger level of the particular contest. The
minority rule, as originally stated in the law, appears to be
consistent with this utilitarian intuition.
Of course, once we consider the administrative costs of
distinguishing battery cases resulting from mutual combat
based on the degree of danger under the circumstances, we can
see immediately why the majority rule is attractive. It offers a
simple, straightforward statement of the law that usually
produces the same outcome as the more fine-grained minority
rule. When administrative costs and risks of error are taken
into account, the majority rule is probably preferable on
utilitarian grounds to the minority rule, even though the
minority rule does a better job of tracking the regulatory
dictates of the utilitarian.
In any event, Bohlen appears to have given little
consideration to these issues and instead fashioned a
Restatement rule on mutual combat that is not reflected in
either the majority or minority rules of the common law.
Bohlen’s new rule was approved by the ALI and is part of the
First Restatement of Torts.44
Bohlen’s rule may seem to be welfare maximizing on the
simple basis that it allows for freedom of contract: if people
want to engage in mutual combat, let them do so, and let them
take the injuries that come with it without allowing them to
shift any losses to others. But this simple version of freedom of
contract misses important features of the mutual combat
problem that were reflected in the law.

Id.
Even the use of boxing gloves cannot prevent long term injury from
sustaining repeated concussions—and may increase the risk of such injuries. See, e.g.,
Antoinette Vacca, Boxing: Why It Should Be Down for the Count, 13 SPORTS LAW. J.
207, 216 (2006).
44 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 61 (1934).
42
43
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The most important features that Bohlen’s rule misses
are the risk of escalation and the substantial risk to third
parties. The rules on mutual combat were developed over a
period when men dueled openly in public streets with guns or
swords. A verbal slight might require a man to save face
through an invitation to a deadly contest.45 Whatever its
advantages in regulating aggressive conduct,46 mutual combat,
especially with deadly weapons, imposes risks of unanticipated
escalation and serious injury to third parties. Because of this,
mutual combat is not simply a matter of allocating risks and
rewards within a contract between two combatants. The
welfare-maximizing rule on mutual combat would impose a
prohibition first, and then examine possible exceptions based
on the level of danger to society.
The common law appears to have adopted this approach.
The states that adopted the majority rule drew a distinction
between mutual combat that threatened public order and mutual
combat that did not.47 The majority rule denying consent any
force as a defense applied only to the former.48
Bohlen’s work on mutual combat serves as an example
of the sort of bias that can distort the Restatement process in a
way that is not observed in the common law process. The
consent rule fashioned by Bohlen is disconnected to some of the
fundamental rules and policies reflected in the common law on
mutual combat. Bohlen’s work reflects his vision of how the law
should look, not what the law provided. If it were a rule
generated by a particular judge, it probably would not have
survived the testing (and retesting) process of the common law.
B.

Prosser

According to Priest’s famous critique of Prosser’s work
on the Restatement (Second) of Torts’s Section 402A on
products liability, Prosser persuaded the ALI to adopt its strict
products liability theory on the basis of a small set of cases
that, at best, provided weak support for Prosser’s theory.49 If
45 See Christopher G. Kingston & Robert E. Wright, The Deadliest of Games:
The Institution of Dueling, 76 S. ECON. J. 1094, 1095 (2010).
46 Warren F. Schwartz et al., The Duel: Can These Gentlemen Be Acting
Efficiently?, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 321 (1984) (offering an efficiency theory of dueling).
47 Teeters v. Frost, 292 P. 356, 359-360 (Okla. 1930).
48 Id.
49 George Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of
the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 514 (1985)
(“Prosser’s appendix supported his claim of an explosion in the law toward strict
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Priest’s observation is true, then Prosser’s work serves as
another example of the Restatement process failing to
accurately reflect the development of the common law. Put
another way, it may be another example in which the
preferences of a Restatement Reporter have distorted the
common law in a manner that probably could not have occurred
if the Reporter had been just the author of a judicial opinion.50
Priest’s critique is easily discounted today, particularly
given that the law has advanced well beyond Prosser’s
formulation of Section 402A. Courts have generated a risk-utility
analysis for products liability that effectively incorporates the
structure of negligence doctrine. Now that products liability
shares its most important features with traditional negligence
analysis, there is little reason to worry about the common law
on products liability retaining significant distortions
attributable to the Restatement Section 402A.
Still, in spite of the successful integration of negligence
principles in products liability law, the common law on products
liability remains in a confusing state, and commentators have
struggled to find the consistent patterns in the case law.
Professors Henderson and Twerski, as Restatement Reporters on
products liability, have advanced our understanding greatly by
providing a consistent doctrinal framework for the confusingly
stated and balkanized case law.51
I suspect that the law on products liability would have
developed in a clearer fashion without the distortion initially
provided by Prosser’s Section 402A. The courts have evolved
toward a liability framework that has been available for hundreds
of years. The process of evolution has required some courts to
stumble over the language of the Section until eventually
working their way toward a clear theory of products liability
law grounded in negligence doctrine.

liability by the citation of forty cases. A rereading of these cases today suggests either that
what Prosser meant by strict liability is vastly different from the regime that has evolved or
that Prosser’s discovery of a trend in the case law was largely his own creation.”).
50 I must distinguish my critique of Prosser from a recent article that
suggests that Prosser fell under the influence of tobacco lawyers. See Elizabeth
Laposata, Richard L. Barnes & Stanton Arnold Glantz, Tobacco Industry Influence on
the American Law Institute’s Restatements of Torts and Implications for Its Conflict of
Interest Policies, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2012). That tobacco lawyers lobbied Prosser does
not point unavoidably to the conclusion that he was excessively influenced by their
views. I remain confident of Prosser’s independence from special-interest groups and
hold his work in the highest regard.
51 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.
(1998) (James A.
Henderson, Jr. and Aaron D. Twerski, Reporters).
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Modern design defect litigation has adopted what is
essentially a negligence test for designs: the risk-utility test.
The test could have easily developed from the common law
process without the injection of the strict liability concept in
Section 402A. Indeed, the case of the electric power lines
discussed earlier in Cooley is an early example of a court
applying a risk-utility test to a negligence claim based on the
design of a power delivery system.52 The basic theories of
modern products liability law have been in the courts for
hundreds of years. The current consensus on the legal standard
could have developed just as quickly, and I believe even more
quickly, without Restatement Section 402A.
C.

Third Restatement

The Restatement (Third) of Torts has been in the hands
of many capable Reporters. Unlike the First and Second
Restatements, the Third Restatement does not appear to be
developing under the control of one specific torts scholar. Having
said this, some Reporters have had a bigger impact on the
Restatement (Third) project than others because of the scope of
the pieces they controlled. My late dear friend, Gary Schwartz,
incorporated noticeable changes within the Restatement’s
section for Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm.53
Gary Schwartz was effectively the dean of torts scholars
in America before his untimely death. For many years, tort
scholarship has been divided into utilitarian and corrective
justice camps—a division that crystallized as the sophistication
of scholarship advanced. Gary Schwartz was the rare example
of a scholar whose advice was accepted willingly by scholars in
both camps. He steadfastly maintained a position of
detachment from either camp, and discussed their respective
arguments from an independent point of view. A good law
school dean is both an intellectual leader and a force for
reconciliation among opposing factions on a law faculty. Gary
Schwartz filled this role for torts scholars. His absence has
been and remains a serious loss for torts scholarship.
Having an open mind and a willingness to listen to all
perspectives, however, did not prevent Schwartz from picking
and choosing among arguments. Indeed, Schwartz was
aggressive in imposing his views on the Third Restatement. Two
52
53

See Cooley v. Pub. Serv. Co., 10 A.2d 673 (N.H. 1940).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOTIONAL HARM (2012).
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areas in which Schwartz incorporated drastic changes in the
Restatement are the law of duty and the law of strict liability.
1. Schwartz on Duty
In his capacity as Restatement Reporter, Schwartz
treated duty as essentially a “wild card” doctrine in tort law.
Courts could resort to it when they found special policy or
pragmatic reasons that a defendant should not be held liable
even though a straightforward examination of the breach and
causation issues would point toward liability.54 In other words,
duty doctrine was an empty vessel into which courts poured
their case-specific policy views whenever those views required
a deviation from the standard application of negligence law.
This was not a new argument. Prosser had described
duty doctrine in the same terms in his hornbook. The difference,
however, is that Prosser confined his views on the function of
duty doctrine to his hornbook and did not attempt to incorporate
them into the Restatement (Second).55 Indeed, Prosser’s
Restatement (Second) is respectful of negligence’s traditional
four-part analysis of duty, breach, causation, and damages.
Schwartz updated the Restatement portion on negligence to
relegate the duty component to a secondary role.
I agree broadly with both Prosser and Schwartz on the
necessarily ad hoc and pragmatic function of duty doctrine in
negligence law. And like them, I believe it plays a secondary
role. Unlike Schwartz—and to some extent unlike Prosser,
too—I have attempted to explain in utilitarian terms the
precise function duty doctrine plays in tort law.56 Duty is not an
empty vessel used to hold the momentary pragmatic concerns
that a particular case may generate. Rather, duty doctrine

54 Id. § 7 cmt. a (“[I]n some categories of cases, reasons of principle or policy
dictate that liability should not be imposed. In these cases, courts use the rubric of duty
to apply general categorical rules withholding liability.”).
55 See John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third)
and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 674 (2001) (“It would not
be surprising to learn that Prosser was attracted to the formulation of Section 281 in part
because it avoided talk of duty. However, Prosser kept some distance between his
academic critique of the concept of duty in law review articles, and his active deployment
of that concept in a Restatement or treatise. . . . Prosser continued to rely on the
traditional four-part formula through several editions of his treatise and casebook.”).
56 Keith N. Hylton, Duty in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 75 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1501 (2006).
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shows consistent patterns and performs identifiable functions
in tort law.57
As between Prosser and Schwartz, I favor Prosser’s
approach. Prosser recognized the policy bases for duty doctrine,
though he never attempted to set out a general theory on the
subject. He saw that there was sufficient substance to respect the
role of duty doctrine in negligence law, and for that reason did not
attempt to minimize its importance in the Second Restatement.
Schwartz, in contrast, had little patience for mystical
and tradition-based arguments. He was aware of the policy
conjectures that Prosser had set out, but Schwartz believed
Prosser’s account fell short of providing a rigorous functional
theory of duty doctrine. At the time that Schwartz approached
the subject, there was no functional account of duty doctrine.
And although Schwartz listened to all perspectives with
respect, he could be counted on to reject a non-rigorous, purely
tradition-based argument. Seeing no rigorous argument for
giving duty doctrine an important status in the structure of
negligence law, Schwartz relegated it to a secondary position.
To give just one example of what a richer account of
duty doctrine would entail, consider the law governing the duty
of self-care in the course of a rescue attempt. Eckert v. Long
Island Railroad58 holds that a person who is injured by the
defendant in the course of an attempt to rescue a third party
will be found liable of contributory negligence only if his
conduct is reckless.59 In terms of duty analysis, Eckert relieves
the rescuer of a duty of ordinary care with respect to his own
safety; he breaches the duty of care only by engaging in
reckless conduct.60 What is the function of this relief? The relief
serves, in effect, as a subsidy to rescuers. The law on rescue
shows a reluctance to punish individuals for failing to rescue.
At the same time, it provides liability relief to those who
attempt to rescue. To use Saul Levmore’s analogy, the law of
57 Id. at 1501-02 (summarizing the functions of duty law: to subsidize
desirable activities by removing the threat of liability, to support property rights, and
to prevent liability risk from distorting markets).
58 Eckert v. Long Island R.R. Co., 43 N.Y. 502, 506 (1871).
59 Id. (“The law has so high a regard for human life that it will not impute
negligence to an effort to preserve it, unless made under such circumstances as to
constitute rashness in the judgment of prudent persons. For a person engaged in his
ordinary affairs, or in the mere protection of property, knowingly and voluntarily to
place himself in a position where he is liable to receive a serious injury, is negligence,
which will preclude a recovery for an injury so received; but when the exposure is for
the purpose of saving life, it is not wrongful, and therefore not negligent unless such as
to be regarded either rash or reckless.”).
60 Id.

2014] ECONOMICS OF THE RESTATEMENT AND COMMON LAW

617

rescue is a policy leaning toward carrots and away from
sticks.61 Such a view of the law governing rescue provides a set
of policies that a Restatement Reporter could use in examining
details in the case law on the subject matter.62 A richer
understanding of duty doctrine provides not just a one-off
explanation for a particular case, but a basis for reconsidering
a set of doctrines associated with a recurrent scenario.
2. Schwartz on Strict Liability
The other major change Schwartz imposed in the Third
Restatement is the provision on strict liability for hazardous
activities. Schwartz replaced the Second Restatement’s six-part
test for strict liability with a simpler, two-part test.63
Under Prosser’s guidance, the Second Restatement
created a six-part test for strict liability. Found in Section 520,
the test evaluated whether: (1) the risk of harm is great, (2) the
harm that would occur is great, (3) the harm could not be
prevented by reasonable care, (4) the activity is not one of
common usage, (5) the activity is inappropriate for its location,
and (6) the social value of the activity is not sufficient to offset
the risks.64 The six-factor test of Section 520 appears to be
consistent with the common law of strict liability.65
The Third Restatement replaces the six-factor test with
a two-factor test. The Third Restatement eliminates the last
two factors and collapses the first three parts of Section 520 into
one question—is the residual risk of harm great when the
defendant takes care? The comments to this section of the
Restatement soften the impact of these changes by reintroducing
the “benefit to the plaintiff” as a factor to be considered in
analyzing strict liability.66
The different formulations of the strict liability test in
the Second and Third Restatements are capable of being
61 Saul Levmore, Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive
Structure of the Law of Affirmative Obligations, 72 VA. L. REV. 879, 882-94 (1986).
62 On the case for integrating instrumentalist policy reasoning with the
Restatement process, see Keith N. Hylton, The Theory of Tort Doctrine and the
Restatement (Third) of Torts, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1413 (2001).
63 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 20(b) (2011) (“An activity is abnormally dangerous if: (1) the activity creates a
foreseeable and highly significant risk of physical harm even when reasonable care is
exercised by all actors; and (2) the activity is not one of common usage.”).
64 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977).
65 See Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Nuisance Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW, 323-43 (K. Ayotte & H.E. Smith eds., 2011).
66 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 20(b), cmt. k.
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interpreted so that they are consistent with one another and
produce the same outcome in any particular case. One could
argue, for example, that the commonality inquiry of the Third
Restatement incorporates the “appropriateness” and “value”
inquiries of the last two parts of Section 520 in the Second
Restatement. But if one chooses not to read the tests so that
they are equivalent, then one is left with the claim that an
examination of commonality does all of the work that used to
be accomplished by the last two factors of Section 520.
This is a doubtful claim. Commonality is an empirical
question that is easy to address in extreme cases but otherwise
difficult to answer. Was the storage of water—to be used as a
source of power for a production facility—common at the time
of Rylands v. Fletcher?67 I suspect the answer is yes, though I
am also inclined to believe that this is a matter of opinion.
Certainly the storage of water for the purpose of powering mills
was not a rare phenomenon in the middle 1800s.68
How does one determine if an activity is sufficiently
common to merit an exemption from strict liability? The
obvious question that follows any attempt to determine
whether something is common is to ask “common relative to
what”? The commonality test of the Third Restatement sounds
deceptively simple, but it raises more questions than it answers.
I am not sure that the commonality test, by itself, would support
the court’s conclusion in Rylands v. Fletcher, which is a deeply
troubling turn of affairs. The Restatement project, which has
admirably attempted to codify the doctrine of strict liability,
has at length found its way to a rule that appears to be
incompatible with the framework set out in Rylands v.
Fletcher. If accepted literally by courts, the Third Restatement’s
commonality test would mark a significant departure from the
common law of strict liability
CONCLUSION
The foregoing examples are instances in which the
individual preferences of Restatement Reporters have led them
to interpret and describe the law in a way that is not consistent
with the common law at the time of their reports. What
explains these excesses? I think it largely comes down to the
Fletcher v. Rylands, [1866] H.L. 1 Ex. 265 (U.K.) (Blackburn, J.).
A. W. B. Simpson, Legal Liability for Bursting Reservoirs: The Historical
Context of Rylands v. Fletcher, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 216 (1984).
67
68
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checks and balances inherent in the common law process and
their absence in the Restatement process.
Everyone comes to work with their preferences,
including judges. Rational individuals will always act to satisfy
their preferences within the constraints that are set before
them. Duty can be defined generally as acting against the
satisfaction of one’s own preferences in order to carry out the
requirements of some position or station in society. The law
provides a set of constraints that restrict the freedom of
individuals to act exclusively in a manner that satisfies their
own preferences. The relatively few individuals who are
motivated by an internal sense of duty have little need for the
law’s constraints. But just as the law constrains individuals in
their interactions with others, the common law process
constrains judges from operating according to their own
preferences at all times.
An individual judge writes with a keen awareness that
his arguments will be reviewed by later courts, which, by itself,
constrains the tendency to substitute one’s own interpretive
preferences for an objective rendering of the law and its
associated policies. The review process permits well-reasoned
arguments to have a continuing impact on the law, while the
poorly reasoned arguments are discarded. The reasonableness
standard in the common law of torts provides a utilitarian
metarule to guide courts in making decisions. Thus, judges are
constrained by their perceptions of the likelihood of review,
constrained in fact by a survivorship bias in the common law
(only the best-reasoned arguments survive the process of
review by other courts), and constrained by an overarching
utilitarian framework for policy.
These constraints are not part of the Restatement
process. An individual Reporter can find latitude, even if only
interstitially, to substitute his own preferences, or those of a
lobbying agent, for an objective description of the law and its
policies. Once these preferences become embedded in a
Restatement provision, they can have a distortive effect on the
development of the common law. Instead of unifying the common
law, as Cardozo thought would happen, the Restatement can
create inconsistencies and distortions, in law and in policy,
which courts will be left to sort through over time.

